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The Gallic Ransom and the Sack of Rome: Livy 5.48.7-8* 
 
Ulrike Roth 
 
Introduction 
 
It has repeatedly been suggested that the ransom agreement between Rome and the Gauls reported by Livy 
in his account of the Gallic attack on Rome in (traditionally) 390 BC proves that Rome was not taken in its 
entirety (5.48.7-8).1 Instead, the ransom – widely assumed to be the authentic stuff of history – is 
understood to have been agreed between the men that held out on the Capitoline Hill and the besieging 
Gauls, in order to lift the Gallic siege.2 Livy states that the army, worn out by hunger, ‘declared that they 
must either surrender or ransom themselves, on whatever conditions they could make’, since the Gauls 
clearly indicated that ‘no great price would be required to induce them to raise the siege’ (vel dedi vel redimi se 
quacumque pactione possent iussit, iactantibus non obscure Gallis haud magna mercede se adduci posse ut obsidionem 
relinquant, 5.48.7). Quintus Sulpicius for the Romans, and Brennus for the Gauls, agreed a thousand pounds 
of gold as the price (et mille pondo auri pretium populi, 5.48.8). Back in 1957, McGann asked rhetorically ‘(i)f 
the Gauls were in control of every part of the city, who paid them the ransom?’; he concluded that ‘(i)f any 
Romans continued to live in the occupied city, they would have been in no position to offer gold in return 
for evacuation since all their wealth would already have been taken from them’.3 Following this line of 
reasoning, the mention of the ransom is seen as evidence that the Gauls could not have taken the Capitoline 
Hill. The idea is so entrenched that Varro’s testimony of the Gallic take-over of Rome in de vita populi Romani 
ii4 has been challenged (and emended) because of his mention, in de vita i, of a juicy ransom payment to the 
Gauls,5 resulting, in Skutsch’s words, in an ‘apparent contradiction’.6 As Horsfall comments: ‘clearly, if the 
Capitol was seized (fr. 61 [...]), then the circumstances in which a ransom was paid, let alone recovered (fr. 
62) are not easy to envisage’.7 The ransom, then, also mentioned in other authors,8 is taken to fit (only) into 
a story-line in which Rome was not completely captured.  
                                                                                       
* For comments and discussion I owe thanks to James Clackson, Michael Crawford, Ben Gray, and Jim Roy. Texts 
of classical authors have been taken from the Loeb Classical Library; the translations have been adapted from those 
given there. 
1 The ‘traditional’ date may be three to four years adrift from what is more likely to have been the year in which Rome 
was attacked by Gallic invaders, i.e. either in 387 or 386 BC: for brief discussion, see Cornell 1995, 313-4. 
2 e.g., Cornell 1995, 318; Ogilvie 1965, 736; cf. Polyb. 1.6.3. I have adopted the generic term ‘Capitoline Hill’ for 
Capitolium atque arx in this article, including with regard to 5.47.1 where Livy identifies the target of the Gallic attack 
as arx Romae Capitoliumque (in contrast to his use of ‘arx’ elsewhere, e.g. at 5.43.1). For discussion of term(s) and 
locations, see Oakley 1997, 496 (on 6.11.4, with further references); Richardson 1992, 40 (‘Arx’) and 68-70 
(‘Capitolinus Mons’); Platner and Ashby 1965, 54-5 (‘Arx’) and 95-8 (‘Capitolinus Mons’); for a full list of mentions in 
the Latin literary sources, see Kardos 2000, 339-88; and for succinct topographical discussion, see Steinby ed. 1993, 
vol. 1, 127-9 and 226-34. 
3 McGann 1957, 127 (note 4). 
4 Non. p. 800L = fr. 61 Rip.: ut noster exercitus ita sit fugatus ut Galli Romae Capitoli sint potiti neque inde ante sex 
menses cesserint; Romae nisi Capitoli (Popma) / Romae praeter Capitolium (Riposati). 
5 Non. p. 338L = fr. 62 Rip.: auri pondo duo milia acceperunt, ex aedibus sacris et matronarum ornamentis; a quibus 
postea id aurum et torques aureae multae relatae Romam et consecratae. 
6 Skutsch 1978, 93. 
7 Horsfall 1981-2, 300 (who ‘solves’ the problem by (rightly) denying the need for Varronian consistency and putting 
emphasis on Varro’s ‘practice of setting down numerous versions of a story’). 
8 cf. Poly. 1.6.2-3 and 2.18.2-3, twice noting that the Capitoline Hill was not taken, without mention of a ransom 
payment; but note, e.g., Ogilvie 1965, 736: ‘(t)he ransom is assumed but not stated’; similarly already Walbank 1957-
1979, I, ad loc. (p. 185), who speaks of ‘the ransom, which was probably paid’ (see also p. 48 (1.6.3)). Diod. Sic. 14.116.7 
mentions the same amount as Livy for the ransom (but embedded in a different narratological rationale); and Varro 
double the amount (see note 5 above). For an example of a later mention of the ransom, see Suet. Tib. 3.2 (providing 
yet another version as to how the ransom was recoverd). 
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 The question of the scale of the Gallic attack on Rome has attracted much discussion.9 Scholars 
also remain divided on whether there once existed a version of the attack that narrated the Gauls’ complete 
take-over of the city, including the Capitoline Hill and its temples.10 Whatever the scale of the attack, it is 
the aim of this contribution to show that the ransom agreement cannot be used against the idea that Rome 
was taken in its entirety: ransom agreements are well documented in our evidence as an option available to 
a city, people or individuals taken by military force; the Romano-Gallic ransom agreement might, therefore, 
potentially stem from a version of the story that actually saw Rome captured in its entirety – whatever the 
historical reality. To argue this point, I begin by contextualising ransom on other known occasions, from 
the mid-republican to the late republican period, before looking more closely at Livy’s narrative of the 
Gallic attack of Rome and the ransom payment: that narrative, I contend, fits perfectly with the idea that 
Rome was taken (in its entirety), and that the ransom was solicited not in Rome but outside of the city. I 
show subsequently how Livy’s later narrative in Book 6 of the AVC provides implicit confirmation of this 
view, corroborating the notion that Livy chose to foreground a version of the story that was more 
acceptable for his Roman audience than the (story of a complete) Gallic take-over would have been; at the 
same time, Livy’s narrative leaves enough of a trace of that other, embarrassing and humiliating story, in 
which the city destined to rule the world was sacked ... by the Gauls. As Williams has stated rightly, ‘(i)t is 
apparent from the extant versions [of the Gallic Sack of Rome] that the tradition of the sack was constantly 
remade, and at any one time circulated in a number of different versions’11: which of the ‘sack narratives’ 
drawn on by Livy in quite different ways is closer to the historical truth is not answerable from the texts 
focussed on here. But, as this article shows, that Livy knew that other, less charming version for Rome 
should no longer be questioned because of the mention of a ransom. 
 
Ransom contexts 
 
First, it is of course standardly reported that captives taken in battle might subsequently be sold into slavery. 
Varro lists this form of enslavement as one of six ways to acquire legal ownership over another human 
being through purchase – ‘if he has bought him at an auction of war booty sub corona’.12 Later Romans 
conceptualised enslavement after battle as saving the individuals concerned from death: the jurist 
Florentinus writes that ‘slaves are so called because commanders generally sell the people they capture and 
thereby save them instead of killing them’.13 To avoid such a situation, a ransom agreement might be struck. 
This could include the exchange of captives between the involved parties, as Livy mentions for the year 
217 BC, when Roman and Carthaginian forces agreed to exchange prisoners one-for-one, and that a money 
ransom of two and a half pounds of silver was to be paid for each captive over and above the one-for-one 
exchange (in this event paid for by a private individual, the then dictator Q. Fabius Maximus, and financed 
                                                                                       
9 See, e.g., Cornell 1995, 317-8; Ogilvie 1965, 719-20. Oakley 1997, 344-6 offers a brief historiographical overview of 
modern approaches. 
10 Skutsch (1953, 1968, 138-42, and 1978) has produced strong arguments in favour of the existence of such an 
alternative version (listing all the relevant texts), to be read with Skutsch 1985, 408; see also Horsfall 1981-2; against, 
Cornell 1986, 247-8 and 1995, 317. The existence of such an alternative version need not imply the burning of the 
Capitoline Hill (with its temples), as suggested by Lucan in his Pharsalia (5.27-8), or indeed the destruction of Rome’s 
infrastructure, elements that are often adduced against the existence of an alternative version and history because of 
their absence from the archaeological record: typical is Cornell 1995, 317-8; also Ogilvie 1965, 720. Note in contrast 
that after the Roman sack of Veii, the city remained in such good shape that it could feature as a possible ‘new’ Rome 
not much long after. 
11 Williams 2001, 142. 
12 Varro, Rust. 2.10.4: ... aut si e praeda sub corona emit. Discussion of this and other evidence for this form of 
enslavement is in Welwei 2000. 
13 Dig. 1.5.4.2: Serui ex eo appellati sunt, quod imperatores captiuos uendere ac per hoc seruare nec occidere solent. 
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through sale of one of his rural estates).14 In a situation similar in some respects to the one typically assumed 
for Rome during the Gallic attack, the Romans accepted ransom from the inhabitants of Palermo, in 259 
BC, after they had taken the outer city and massacred a large number of people. Diodorus Siculus writes 
that ‘the rest fled to the old city from where they sent ambassadors to the [Roman] consuls to ask them to 
spare their lives’: it was agreed that those who could give two minae would be liberated, and the Romans 
then took control of the (entire) city; Diodorus concludes the episode with information on the number of 
people thus freed (14,000 individuals), and the number of those for whom there was no ransom paid and 
who were sold instead with the rest of the booty (13,000 individuals).15 The ransom, then, whilst not 
technically a purchase, is portrayed as an alternative form of payment to that taken in a sale at market for 
each ‘body’.16 But ransom agreements also occur in situations in which a whole people had been taken. 
 A good example of a situation involving a ransom after (complete) capture is provided in Polybius’ 
account of the Roman capture of Aegina in 210 BC under Sulpicius Galba. Polybius states the following:17 
 
When Aegina was taken by the Romans, such of the inhabitants as did not escape having been assembled on the ships 
beggged the proconsul to allow them to send envoys to cities of kindred race to obtain ransom (πρὸς τὰς συγγενεῖς πόλεις 
περὶ λύτρων). Publius at first refused very sharply, saying that they ought to have sent envoys to their betters to come 
and save them while they were still their own masters and not now they were slaves (μὴ νῦν δούλους γεγονότας). That they 
who a short time ago had not even deigned to reply to his envoys, now when they had fallen into his power should 
request leave to send envoys to their kinsmen was most foolish. So at the time he dismissed those who had approached 
him with these words, but next day summoning all the prisoners of war, he said he was under no obligation to be 
lenient to the Aeginetans, but for the sake of the rest of the Greeks he would allow them to send envoys to get ransom, 
as such was their custom (περὶ τῶν λύτρων, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἐστίν).  
 
It is irrelevant for present purposes that Polybius later gives away that the people of Aegina were after all 
sold into slavery, and Aegina given over to the Aetolians.18 The passage exemplifies clearly a situation in 
which capture (here of an island city-state) had been complete without this preventing the possibility of 
securing a ransom agreement: Aegina hoped (and expected) to solicit assistance from other powers (τὰς 
συγγενεῖς πόλεις). Ransom and complete capture can, then, go hand in hand. Welwei calls Sulpicius’ explanation 
for allowing the Aeginetans to collect ransom – i.e. Greek custom – ‘ein perfider Trick’: Sulpicius is seen 
to be keen to boost his war coffers, implying that the permission to collect ransom was motivated by 
economic considerations, not adherence to Greek cultural norms.19 Whatever Sulpicius’ motives, 
Horsmann (in his revised edition of Volkmann’s study of mass enslavements after military encounters) 
comes to the general conclusion that redemption was possible for a (completely) captured town if economic 
motives were the driving force behind its capture: ‘Da es dem Eroberer meist allein um den Beutewert der 
Gefangenen ging, ist die redemptio ab hostibus für die Bevölkerung einer erorberten Stadt [...] keineswegs ganz 
unmöglich gewesen’.20 Horsmann points also to the wider contexts, such as (in the Greek world) proxeny, 
and asylum, in which city-states and peoples related to one another, encouraging mutual redemption in 
times of crisis. Ransom agreements can of course also be influenced by other motives, including strategic 
or political ones – as in the case of the Illyrian capture of Phoenice, in 230 BC. Notwithstanding the complex 
                                                                                       
14 Livy 22.23.6-8. 
15 Diod. Sic. 23.18. 
16 Ransom was, however, not always required for the liberation of captives, nor did ransom agreements automatically 
follow surrender, nor did these automatically protect captives from enslavement: in 15.4.1, Polybius reports that in 
the Second Punic War, Publius Scipio did not agree to terms for those who freely surrendered to him, but enslaved 
them instead; and in 10.17.6-15, Polybius narrates how after the capture of Carthago Nova, in 210 BC, the Romans 
let the citizens go free without ransom, but enslaved the craftsmen to employ them in their own service, with a promise 
of subsequent freedom. Discussion (and other examples) is in Volkmann 1990, 105-10. 
17 Polyb. 9.42.5-8. 
18 Polyb. 11.5.6-8 and 22.8.9-12. 
19 Welwei 2000, 120. 
20 Volkmann 1990, 123 and 158 (regarding p. 81). 
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developments as recounted by Polybius, the Illyrians, having taken the city and defeated a relief army of 
(other) Epirotes, were incidentally recalled to Illyria by Queen Teuta because of trouble at home; they 
consequently agreed to a truce just before giving battle to a combined force of Epirotes, Aetolians and 
members of the Achaean league, the latter two having been called to help by the Epirotes.21 By the mutually 
agreed terms, the Illyrians were to release the city and its free population on payment of a ransom, taking 
also their booty consisting of slaves and goods of all kinds with them: ‘after plundering Epirus, [the Illyrians] 
made a truce with the Epirotes, by the terms of which they gave up to them the city and its free population 
on payment of a ransom; the slaves and other goods and chattels they put on board their boats’.22 The 
ransom followed the plundering, as Polybius states; and the captured city benefitted from the support of 
its kinsmen and allies, as Aegina had also hoped. The case of Thalamai, in the territory of Elis, demonstrates 
the same underlying approach to ransom just a decade later: having been captured by Philip V, King of 
Macedon, in 219 BC, the captives were taken to Olympia.23 For reasons that are of no interest to the present 
inquiry, Philip agreed at Olympia to let the captives go free without a (monetary) ransom if Elis went over 
to his side: ‘if they joined him he would return all captured men and animals without ransom (χωρὶς 
λύτρων)’.24 Once more, complete capture did not stand in the way of a ransom agreement in principle.  
 Livy, too, was fully aware of the practice of ransom after a city had been captured: in his account 
of what we call the Second Macedonian War, for instance, Livy discusses a number of attacks on cities, 
including the capture and ransoming of their inhabitants. Thus, Livy recounts that the people of Eretria 
fled to the arx of their city when Lucius Quinctius took the town, before they eventually surrendered: Livy 
comments immediately thereafter on the monetary value of the town’s holdings, including works of art, 
statues, inscriptions, and so forth (32.16.10-17). Livy continues his account with the capture of Carystus: 
having fled to the arx upon the arrival of the enemy army, the people of Carystus sent ambassadors to seek 
protection from the Romans; they were granted life and liberty (vita ac libertas) upon the agreement of a 
ransom payment of 300 nummi for each individual. Having paid the ransom, they were transported to 
Boeotia unarmed (32.17.1-3). And the Dymaei, who had been captured by a Roman army, are recounted 
by Livy as having been freed on the orders of Philip of Macedon through ransom payments wherever they 
were enslaved (cum redimi eos, ubicumque servirent, 32.22.10).  
 The Polybian account of the fate of Aegina in 210 BC, discussed above, implies of course that the 
practice of asking for ransom after capture was specifically Greek (παρ’ αὐτοἱς ἔθος ἐστίν). Polybius, like 
anyone else, would have known that Rome acted quite differently when capturing neighbouring Etruscan, 
Latin and, later, Italic cities.25 Symptomatic is Livy’s bland description of Camillus’ action after his heroic 
capture of Veii, in 396 BC: Postero die libera corpora dictator sub corona vendidit (On the following day the dictator 
sold the free inhabitants sub corona, 5.22.1). The mass enslavements (in Italy) that Livy lists for the remaining 
                                                                                       
21 Polyb. 2.5-6. Polybius implies, at 2.6.4, that the Illyrians also feared a disadvantageous battlefield. 
22 Polyb. 2.6.5-6: ... οὕτω λεηλατήσαντες τὴν Ἤπειρον ἀνοχὰς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἠπειρώτας. ἐν αἷς τὰ μὲν ἐλεύθερα σώματα καὶ τὴν 
πόλιν ἀπολυτρώσαντες αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ δουλικὰ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν σκευὴν ἀναλαβόντες εἰς τοὺς λέμβους ... (Volkmann 1990, 129, wrongly 
understood the ransom to consist of the mentioned booty (i.e. the slaves and various goods), rather than of a separate 
payment.) The actions of C. Flavius Fimbria, in the mid 80s BC, in Thrace, Nicomedia, and Phrygia, allowing his 
soldiers to plunder and enslave at will and with the utmost brutality, and compelling the citizens of Cyzicus to ransom 
themselves by surrendering their property to him (λύτρα τῆς σωτηρίας), are not, as far as it is possible to tell, identical 
with the type of situation here discussed, despite Diodorus’ use of the term λύτρα; the case of Cyzicus is, for all its 
misery, not that of a sack, capture or siege, whilst that of Ilium, clearly labelled as taken by siege by Strabo (ἐκ πολιορκίας), 
does not offer information on the events after Fimbria’s capture of the city: Diod. Sic. 38.8; Strabo 13.1.27 (C 594); 
brief discussion in Volkmann 1990, 65-6. 
23 Polyb. 4.75. 
24 Polyb. 4.84.3-4.  
25 But note that Levithan 2013, 12-21 elaborates the wider cultural context of siege warfare, and suggests, at 19-20, 
that there existed a shared understanding amongst different ancient peoples (including Greeks and Hebrews) of the 
expectations of siege warfare.   
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fourth, and the third century BC, are striking corroboration of this fundamentally different Roman 
approach to the capture of a city, ‘made in Italy’.26 The matter found unusual comment: Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus states that Pyrrhus, who arrived on the Italian scene upon the invitation of Taranto in 281 
BC to assist against the Roman forces under L. Aemilius Barbula, wrote to the Roman consul P. Valerius 
Laevinus to say that he would prevent the Romans from plundering Greek cities, demolishing allied towns, 
and selling free people into slavery.27 The historical context of expanding Roman control on the Italian 
peninsula from the fourth century onwards, including the foundation of colonies and land settlements, 
involves Roman behaviour different from the custom of the Greeks. But this is not to say that the Romans 
took the same approach when it came to Rome. Naturally, we do not know what the corresponding Roman 
practice could look like, given that, according to the dominent historical record, Rome the city was never 
taken (in the republican period). Our ignorance is shared, however, by Livy: he too would have had no 
better knowledge of Roman practice around 400 BC than what he ultimately passed on in the AVC.28 Livy’s 
narrative was of course also shaped by contemporary models. To gain a firmer foothold, then, on the 
meaning of ransom in Livy’s story of the Gallic attack on Rome, it is important to take account also of later 
examples that would have been known to Livy and his audience, and that would have influenced their views 
on the Roman capacity to try and raise a ransom in case of capture. 
 First, then, there is P. Clodius Pulcher, who was taken captive after the defeat of a Roman naval 
force in Cilicia by a fleet of pirates in 67 BC. Clodius immediately appealed to King Ptolemy of nearby 
Cyprus to pay the ransom money (who offered an insufficient sum of 2 talents, i.e. 48,000 sesterces). 
Verboven writes that ‘the very fact that Ptolemy offered such a ridiculously low sum as contribution 
suggests that no personal connection existed between them’:29 Clodius’ request must have been framed by 
broader practices. Appian’s brief mention of the episode in the second book of his Civil Wars also implies 
widespread familiarity with the practice: he scorns ‘the avaricious Ptolemy’ for his pathetic contribution to 
the ransom, suggesting an expectation of support across Graeco-Roman networks.30 Dio’s Roman History, 
too, recounts Clodius’ anger over the lack of due support on the part of Ptolemy for the ransom payment;31 
in the end, Clodius gets freed without a ransom payment. Personal offence and the particular outcome of 
the matter aside, the Roman general P. Clodius Pulcher acts as an individual and representative of the 
Roman state in the same structural manner as (for instance) Aegina the Greek city-state in the example cited 
above: he seeks help from a nearby power to solicit the ransom. 
 This pattern is also evident in the ransom solicited by Caesar for his release from being held captive 
by pirates near the island of Pharmacusa, possibly in 77 BC, possibly on his way to Rhodes. Having himself 
arrogantly suggested 50 in place of the requested 20 talents for his liberation from the Cilicians, Caesar ‘sent 
various followers to various cities to procure the money’; he himself was kept in captivity with just three 
others, including according to Suetonius one physician and two personal attendants – stating also explictly 
that his other travelling companions and slaves were released for the purpose of soliciting the ransom.32 
Plutarch reports that the ransom was provided by the city-state of Miletus; Velleius Paterculus suggests that 
                                                                                       
26 See Volkmann 1990, 36-45 (for Italy); and Harris 1979, 58-60 for brief discussion of Livy’s evidence for the number 
of war captives in the so-called Third Samnite War.  
27 Dion. Hal. 19.9.4. 
28 Livy of course did not simply reproduce his sources; see Luce 1971 for an analysis of Livy’s structuring of the 
passages of interest here.  
29 Verboven 2002, 84. The practice of providing ransom for others on the basis of one own’s wealth is also mentioned 
in Cic. Off. 2.16.56. 
30 App. B Civ. 2.23. 
31 Cass. Dio 38.30.5. 
32 Plut. Vit. Caes. 2.1-3; Suet. Iul. 4.1. 
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more than one city assisted with the ransom, sourced from their public coffers:33 either way, as in the case 
of P. Clodius Pulcher, Caesar evidently sought support from nearby powers, and clearly not in vain. It is 
notable in this context that both Velleius Paterculus and Valerius Maximus stress that Caesar was then 
merely a private citizen, with particular regard, in the case of Velleius Paterculus, to the actions taken by 
Caesar. Both episodes taken together demonstrate, then, that the Romans knew and took advantage of the 
practice of soliciting ransom from nearby (and assumedly friendly) powers in case of capture, whether acting 
as private individuals (as Caesar did) or on behalf of the (Roman) state (as in the case of P. Clodius Pulcher): 
however thin the evidence, going by what we have available, Roman practice away from Rome was not 
noticeably different from the custom of the Greeks in the period in which Rome’s history was (re)written. 
But what about (early) Rome? 
 
Contextualising the Gallic ransom 
 
In his Roman Antiquities, Dionysius of Halicarnassus attributed to Romulus the institution of rules for 
patronage. Following a brief description of the duties of patrons, Dionysius lists the duties of clients: besides 
assisting their patrons in providing dowries for their daughters, discharging their patrons’ losses in private 
suits and pecuniary fines by the state, and sharing with their patrons the costs incurred in their political 
offices and through public expenditures, Dionysius also states that they ‘pay their ransom to the enemy if 
any of them or of their children were taken prisoner’ (... καὶ λύτρα καταβάλλειν πολεμίοις, εἴ τις αὐτῶν ἢ παίδων 
αἰχμάλωτος γένοιτο).34 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, then, was able to project into the mythological past of 
Rome a rule guiding the soliciting of a ransom payment amongst private citizens. Moreover, he continued 
the ‘Roman myth of patronage’35 by plainly stating that this relationship between clients and patrons 
continued for many generations; more still, he added that it was effective ‘not only in the city itself’, but 
that it extended to ‘every colony of Rome and every city that had joined in alliance and friendship with her 
and also every city conquered in war’.36 As Drummond has argued, we need not assume a legal basis for 
Dionysius’ comments:37 for the most part, Dionysius himself refers to the ‘rules of patronage’ as custom 
(ἔθη), not law.38 Varro and Valerius Antias are the more likely candidates for having provided Dionysius 
with the source material for his embellished recreation of patronage in Romulean Rome39 – sources also 
available to Livy. Drummond contended that ‘Livy is bewilderingly haphazard in his references to an 
institution in which he is clearly little interested’;40 yet Livy makes both direct and indirect reference to the 
institution precisely in his narrative of the Gallic attack on Rome: at 5.32.8, Camillus rejects his clients’ offer 
to pay the fine that would prevent his exile; and at 5.47.8, the soldiers’ food offerings to Marcus Manlius 
Capitolinus craftily assimilate the men to clients, and Manlius to a patron.41 Livy thus played with the same 
kind of information for the ‘rules of patronage’ in early Rome as Dionysius – however historically incorrect 
from a modern perspective. Importantly, the roles of clients and patrons in this ‘myth making’ were filled 
by the plebeians (= clients) and the patricians (= patrons) respectively. Livy moreover explicitly states that 
Camillus’ clients formed a large part of the plebeians: ... quae magna pars plebis erat ... (5.32.8). It is time to 
                                                                                       
33 Plut. Vit. Caes. 2.3; Vell. Pat. 2.42.2. If the account of Valerius Maximus were the only one to have survived, all that 
would be known is that Caesar managed to ransom himself: Val. Max. 6.9.15. 
34 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom 2.10.2. 
35 Verboven 2002, 84. 
36 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.11.1. 
37 Drummond 1990, 90-1. 
38 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom 2.10.1. 
39 Balsdon 1971, 27. 
40 Drummond 1990, 94. 
41 Discussed in Ogilvie 1965, 735, and Jaeger 1997, 72-3. 
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return with all this in mind to the story of the Gallic attack on Rome. 
 It is of course the case that the ransom money in the story of the Gallic attack on Rome belongs 
(as it has survived in large part) to the narrative strand concerned with the succesful defence of the 
Capitoline Hill. But even if it were transposed from there to a narrative concerned with the fall of Rome – 
hill and all included, it would not be out of place. Whilst unlike in Greece there is no evidence that (e.g.) 
the Latin city-states supported each other with ransom in case of capture, the narrative strand of the Gallic 
attack of Rome ends, in its current form, with – as Livy visualises it – a small number of (Roman) men, 
women and children on the Capitoline Hill (5.39.4; 5.39.9), many others slaughtered in battle (at the Allia 
and from there at the Tiber: 5.38.8), the elder senators killed (5.41.9-10), and a majority at various stages of 
the happenings having dispersed into the neighbouring cities and countryside (e.g. to Veii: 5.38.5; 5.39.4; 
5.39.6). As Livy put it wryly: ‘the chief part got safely to Veii ...’ (maxima tamen pars incolumis Veios perfugit, 
5.38.9), ‘some scattered through the countryside, and others made for the towns nearby’ (pars per agros dilapsi, 
pars urbes petunt finitimas, 5.40.6). We are moreover explicitly told that most able-bodied men were gathering 
in Veii (and some also at Ardea) at the time – where they would in due course be trained and prepared for 
battle with the Gallic invaders under Camillus’ leadership (5.46.4; 5.46.10-11; 5.48.5). In short, a large 
number of Romans were outside Rome when the Gauls arrived; and their temporary migration did not cut 
them off the resources required for instance to train the legions.  
 Looking in greater detail at the resources available to those outside Rome, Livy tells us that the 
flamen Quirinalis and the Vestal Virgins took care of the objects of public cult (5.39.11): they brought what 
they could to Etruscan Caere, having buried the rest in dolia in the shrine adjacent to the flamen’s house 
(5.40.7-10). Livy emphasises that in transporting what they could to Caere, flamen and Vestals ignored care 
for their own possessions – contrasting sharply with the actions of others: Lucius Albinius, who helped to 
carry the sacred objects in his wagon to Caere, was, evidently, busy removing his own private belongings 
from Rome, together with his family (5.40.7-10); one wonders what else was taken away by the wagon-load 
by those who left en masse at the same time as Lucius Albinius.42 Indeed, even the grain harvest from the 
fields had been hurriedly, yet with oversight and intent, brought to Veii (5.43.4). It is therefore not surprising 
that, as Cornell has put it,43  
 
(i)t has been reasonably suggested that the flight of the soldiers to Veii was not a spontaneous act arising in the panic 
of the moment, but part of a pre-arranged plan; in other words the Romans, realising that their cause was hopeless 
and that they would be unable to save the city, evacuated it in advance. This would be consistent with the story of 
Albinius and the Vestals. 
 
This view is corroborated by Livy’s mention, at 5.45.4-8, that the (Roman) soldiers who had migrated to 
Veii attacked under the command of Q. Caedicius groups of Etruscans in two night-time raids, following 
the rout of a group of Gauls by an army led by Camillus from Ardea (5.45.1-3). The soldiers who attacked 
the Etruscans had been angered by the latter’s hunt for booty in Rome’s hinterland, and the fact that they 
brought that booty to their camp in plain sight, situated outside Veii (Viderant eos milites Romani vagantes per 
agros et congregato agmine praedam prae se agentis, et castra cernebant haud procul Veiis posita, 5.45.5). Livy states in 
fact openly that irrespective of not (yet) having Camillus as their general (again), the soldiers were in all 
respects organised and operating as a Roman army should (5.45.7-8). It is not surprising, then, that we are 
also informed that these same Roman soldiers took captives after their raids on the Etruscans (5.45.8), i.e. 
that they operated according to the standard terms of warfare.44 The story-line clearly implies that their 
                                                                                       
42 This is not to underestimate the practical limitations and logistical difficulties in removing one’s assets in times of 
persecution or attack, but merely to emphasise the Livian acknowledgement of the (plebeians’) removal of resources 
from Rome. 
43 Cornell 1995, 317, referring to Alföldi 1965, 356 (who emphasises the concerted action and oversight that the 
withdrawal of the soldiers to Veii must have resulted from). 
44 General discussion of terms and practices is in Welwei 2000, passim. 
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booty augmented the resources available to them in Veii.  
 Concerning the resources available to those who remained in Rome, the depiction of their 
oppression by hunger brings home with force the lack of food in town: Livy describes graphically how the 
ongoing undernourishment turned the soldiers’ guard duties into an increasingly impossible task as ‘their 
bodies grew almost too weak to sustain their armour when they went out on picket duty’ (... cum stationes 
procederent prope obruentibus infirmum corpus armis, 5.48.7).45 As regards the non-consumable resources, Livy 
implies that the houses of the elder senators who remained in the city still had possessions in them that the 
Gauls would later take as booty, as did the houses of those in arms up on the Capitoline Hill (5.41.10; 
5.42.4; but cf. 5.41.5-6). And if Diodorus Siculus is to be believed, those of the magistrates who remained 
managed to persuade some of the others to remain too, not flee, and to bring to the Capitoline Hill grain, 
food, and whatever costly goods, including silver and gold, they could.46 But these were, as Livy has made 
sufficiently clear, and as Diodorus also implies, a minority of Rome’s population. All told, and fixed assets 
(and elder senators and national heroes) aside, the population of Rome and its material resources were not 
in Rome at the time of the attack: the eternal city was, for all practical purposes, a ghost town at that point 
in time. Livy consequently comments that the Gauls did not need to take the city by assault (... nec tum impetu 
aut vi capiebant urbem, 5.41.4): once in control, and ‘having vainly for some days waged war against only the 
buildings of Rome’, the Gauls realised that ‘there was nothing left amidst the smouldering ruins of the 
captured city but armed enemies’ (Galli quoque per aliquot dies in tecta modo urbis nequiquam bello gesto cum inter 
incendia ac ruinas captae urbis nihil superesse praeter armatos hostes viderent ..., 5.43.1). 
 When looking back at the attack, in a list of actions taken and proposals made by Camillus after 
the departure of the Gauls, Livy later mentions ‘the gold that had been rescued from the Gauls and that 
had been gathered from other temples into the cella of the temple of Jupiter in the midst of the alarm 
(Aurum quod Gallis ereptum erat quodque ex aliis templis inter trepidationem in Iovis cellam conlatum, 5.50.6). Almost 
predictably, these hidden temple treasures are not touched for the ransom at all in Livy’s narrative; instead, 
the (previously unmentioned) gold held by the state, together with additions from the matronae – copying 
their behaviour in collecting the tithe to help fulfill Camillus’ vow to Apollo after the capture of Veii (5.25.8) 
– is identified as making up the ransom (5.50.7): 
 
Iam ante in eo religio civitatis apparuerat quod cum in publico deesset aurum, ex quo summa pactae mercedis 
Gallis confieret, a matronis conlatum acceperant ut sacro auro abstineretur. 
 
(Even before this the scrupulousness of the citizens had been apparent in this connexion, for when the gold in the 
public coffers was insufficient to make up to the Gauls the stipulated sum, they had accepted what the 
matrons got together, that they might not touch the sacred gold.) 
 
In Varro’s version of the same narrative element, the ransom payment is made up instead by exactly the 
temple treasures, to which is added, once more, the jewellery of the matronae: ex aedibus sacris et matronarum 
ornamentis.47 In the light of Livy’s concern with the proper place of religion at Rome, so forcefully brought 
to the fore not least in Camillus’ speeches, and focussed on Rome’s location, its topography and materiality, 
it is easy to see that the temple treasures needed narratological ‘protection’ in the Livian narrative in order 
to prevent Rome’s ‘religious buy-out’.48 The emphasis on the city’s sacrosanctity is likely to have motivated 
the explicit reference to the collection of the temple treasures into the cella of the temple of Jupiter – 
implying that Rome’s religious core remained in Rome. (But note the glitch with the mention of the flight of 
                                                                                       
45 The scarcity of food is also brought out in the story of the soldiers’ food offerings to Marcus Manlius Capitolinus 
after the defence of the Capitoline Hill (5.47.8), and in the story of the soldiers throwing bread over the walls into the 
outposts of the Gauls (5.48.4). 
46 Diod. Sic. 14.115.4. 
47 Non. p. 338L = fr. 62 Rip. (see note 5 above for the full quotation). 
48 The place of religion in Livy is discussed and demonstrated in great detail in Levene 1993 and Davies 2004, 21-142, 
with different approaches to (and outlooks on) Livy’s religious position. See also Liebeschütz 1967.     
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Vestals and flamen to Caere, as Sordi has succinctly pointed out: ‘L’invio a Cere dei sacerdoti e delle Vestali 
[...] sembra contraddire, però, l’idea che il Campidoglio sia stato difeso in quanto sedes deorum’.49) By contrast, 
Livy does not say where the state treasure was kept. The importance for Rome’s existence of keeping the 
temple treasures in Rome and unspoilt by the Gauls is re-emphasised when at 5.50.6 the gold that was part 
of the ransom is returned, and the concealment of the temple treasures in the cella of the temple of Jupiter 
repeated (where from now on all the gold was to be kept after having been deemed sacred: Aurum quod 
Gallis ereptum erat quodque ex aliis templis inter trepidationem in Iovis cellam conlatum, cum quo referri oporteret confusa 
memoria esset, sacrum omne iudicatum et sub Iovis cella poni iussum). In his analysis of contradictions and doublets 
in Books 4 and 5 of the AVC, Ogilvie showed that the two stories of the donations by the matronae (5.25.8 
and 5.50.7) stem from two different sources (and, hence, stories) used by Livy.50 The fact that Livy makes 
use of the same narrative element (i.e. the matronae’s donations) on two (separate) occasions in his own 
narrative does not enhance the narrated events’ historicity: the matronae-doublet is a painful reminder that 
there is little reason to think that Livy, or his source(s), knew how the Gallic attack on Rome ended, and 
how the ransom, if authentic, was secured. But this does not mean that we cannot get any further with the 
Livian narrative: there is, in fact, a quite different, productive way of looking at the ransom arrangements; 
one that accommodates much of the narrated happenings and what else we know about situations in which 
a ransom is agreed, as surveyed above. It is time to return once more to Veii. 
 If we then assume that Rome was taken, hill and all, i.e. that the Gauls had taken possession of 
precious objects and valuables, as well as the remaining men, should we then believe that the soliciting from 
the other Romans of ransom for their fellow citizens and the city’s liberation, and potentially also from 
neighbouring Latin (e.g. Ardea) and Etruscan (e.g. Caere) cities, was not a very real possibility – a possibility 
denied implicitly and explicitly by McGann and others? Note that the Etruscan city of Clusium sent for 
help to Rome when under attack by the Senones (5.33.1-6) a year or so before Rome itself was attacked by 
the same Gallic tribe – even if we are not told what their request consisted of, apart from the fact that it 
was made despite the lack of formal alliance or friendship between Clusium and Rome (5.35.4-6). As seen 
above, it was perfectly possible in the late Republic and the early Empire for a Roman to solicit ransom 
from nearby powers after (complete) capture, as Clodius and Caesar did; but also to entertain the notion of 
clients in early Rome ransoming their patrons in case of capture. To assume, on the contrary, that the 
invading Gauls and any beleaguered and captured Romans in Rome would not consider at least those 
Romans located outside Rome a potential source of ransom makes nonsense of a narrative element that fits 
perfectly well with the idea of a ransom payment after the Gauls had indeed taken the (whole) city. There 
is widespread agreement amongst scholars that ‘(t)he best explanation of all the evidence is that the Gauls 
were interested in movable booty [...] They ransacked the place, and made off with whatever they could 
carry. The story that they had to be bought off with gold is consistent with this interpretation’.51 But this is 
exactly the kind of situation described by Polybius in the case of Phoenice, discussed above.52 And with (let 
us assume then again) the Capitoline Hill taken and all treasures already in the hands of the Gauls (as far as 
they knew!), what best next before the homeward journey than an agreed ransom that drew also on the 
Romans’ kin and friends located outside Rome – clients (i.e. plebeians) explicitly included (however much 
                                                                                       
49 Sordi 1984, 85. The lasting fascination of the Capitoline Hill – il Campidoglio – is beautifully brought to the fore in 
Parisi Presicce and Danti 2016; and the hill’s religious (and civic) function forcefully restated, e.g. at 9: ‘Il Campidoglio, 
cuore religioso e civile di Roma antica, è sempre stato considerato carico di significati simbolici, talmente emblematici 
da essere adoperato come denominazione del luogo in cui in qualsiasi parte del mondo si insediava un nuovo governo 
democratico’. 
50 Ogilvie 1958, 43-4, with earlier bibliography on the Doublettenjagd. 
51 Cornell 1995, 318. 
52 I elaborate the structural similarities between the Polybian story of the Illyrian attack on Phoenice and the Gallic 
sack of Rome in a forthcoming article: ‘Livy (and Polybius) on the Gallic Sack of Rome’. 
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in their infancy the so-called ‘rules of patronage’ at the time). And the resources – including no doubt the 
most valuable belongings of that part of Rome’s citizen body that had left the town, i.e. the majority – were, 
as seen, available outside Rome.  
  
The Gallic ransom again ... in Book 6 
 
The idea that the citizenry of Rome, albeit outside Rome, could have been responsible for collecting moneys 
for the ransom is not entirely new. And this article, therefore, cannot claim originality for the argument 
here pursued. That claim must fall to Livy or his source(s). For in Book 6 of the AVC, Livy returns one 
more time to the question of the ransom, this time in a reported speech by Camillus’ counter-foil Marcus 
Manlius Capitolinus.53 In that speech, Manlius addresses his favourite topic, i.e. the plight of the plebeians. 
And in this context, the patricians are accused of concealing the ‘Gallic gold’, and of abusing public funds. 
One particular bone of contention there discussed is the plebeians’ unhappiness over the handling of their 
contribution to the ransom during the Gallic attack (6.14.12): 
 
cum conferendum ad redimendam civitatem a Gallis aurum fuerit, tributo conlationem factam, idem aurum 
ex hostibus captum in paucorum praedam cessisse. 
 
(When gold had had to be collected to ransom the state from the Gauls, there had been a levy of tributum; 
but this same gold, after being captured from the enemy, had become the spoil of a few.) 
 
The passage has found surprisingly little comment in the modern scholarly debate on the Romans’ capacity 
to collect ransom for the Gauls.54 In part, this may be motivated by the fact that the various passages in 
Livy’s narrative that deal with the ransom payment do not coincide at first sight. Thus, as seen above, the 
list of actions taken during the crisis included in passing mention of the Romans’ preference to save the 
temple treasures, and to employ instead state funds. But since the state funds were not enough, the matronae 
are adduced to fill the gap, at 5.50.7: no mention there of the levy of a special tax on the citizen body to 
make up the deficit. Ogilvie plainly notes that ‘50, 7 is certainly at variance with 6, 14, 2, where the money 
is said to have been collected tributo’ [in fact: 6.14.12].55 There is no need, in my view, for the two versions 
to be harmonised. But, actually, since Livy clearly states that the public funds were not enough, the tributum 
asked of Rome’s citizens need not be read in contradiction to that earlier comment: it could easily be seen 
as the missing link, i.e. as a means to make up the difference. In similar vein, the story of the tributum can 
also accommodate the donation of the matronae’s jewellery: both sources of funding could be understood 
as adding to the state funds for the ransom.56 Either way, Livy does not actually say, as already noted, where 
the state funds are located, or where the matronae are. Some women (including clearly married women) 
remained in the city (5.40.3-4; 5.42.4). But there is no reason to think that all patricians remained, and that 
only the plebeians (whose jewellery one would assume to have been less in quantity and quality) left for 
Veii or another city. Indeed, in his description of those leaving the city at 5.40.5, Livy says that the majority 
was made up of plebeians, admitting by implication that the group included also patricians (Alia maxime 
plebis turba ...). (Note though, as mentioned twice before, that Livy in any case has his matronae dispose of 
their jewellery already on the occasion of the collection of the gold required in fulfillment of Camillus’ vow 
                                                                                       
53 The counter-positioning of Marcus Furius Camillus and Marcus Manlius Capitolinus in Livy’s narrative has been 
well brought out in Jaeger 1997, 57-93. 
54 Characteristic is Oakley 1997, ad loc. (p. 526), who points back to 5.48.7-9, 5.49.1-2 and 5.50.6-7, but does not 
comment on the seeming contradiction in Livy’s descriptions of the various sources for the ransom; see also Ogilvie 
1965, ‘laudatio’ (50.7; p. 741; and pp. 736-7), who does, in turn, not point forward to the passage in Book 6.  
55 Ogilvie 1958, 43. 
56 If the three elements are harmonised into a single narrative thread for the ransom payment that liberated Rome, the 
ransom would consequently be made up by a three-fold contribution, from all of Rome’s constituent (human) parts: 
the contributions of the state – through the public funds; the contribution of the patricians – through the wealth 
stored away in their wives’ jewellery; and finally that of the plebeians – through the means of tributum.  
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to Apollo – ... omnia ornamenta sua in aerarium detulerunt, leaving them, theoretically, with their natural beauty 
only: 5.25.8-10). But however one wants to understand the relationship between the matronae and the 
tributum, in the light of this massive exodus of human and material resources from Rome, should we really 
assume that the resources that made up the ransom were, in contrast, to be found in the city? Or that, 
moreover, the public funds would have been left behind in what Cornell has termed ‘a pre-arranged plan’ 
(see above) for the evacuation of the city? 
 It is not possible given the confused, potentially multiple narrative(s) of the ransom in Livy, and in 
the lack of sound information in our other sources on this matter, to press the argument for the location 
of the public funds outside Rome beyond what common sense dictates. The matronae are also a slippery 
case: they could be viewed as a reference to the wives who remained in the city. But in Livy’s text, the story 
of the plebeians in general is clear: they left the city with all that they could carry, not unlike the flamen 
Quirinalis and the Vestal Virgins. When they are asked for tributum to make up the ransom, they are, in 
consequence, not in Rome.57 Even accepting, as stated, that the plebeians’ possessions cannot match those 
of the patricians, the Veian war booty delivered unusual riches in particular to the large(r) number of 
plebeians (irrespective of Camillus’ supposed mishandling of the booty: 5.23.8-11; 5.25.7-13; 5.7-9), 
augmented, as stated, by the spoils from their raids on groups of Etruscans in Rome’s hinterland. Besides, 
the story of the tributum implies also a fairly organised set-up, contrary to the impression given by Livy 
elsewhere of the group of plebeians that headed out of Rome ‘without leader or concerted plan’ (5.40.6): 
the citizenry of Rome was, to all appearances, getting itself fairly well organised in the new home, the other 
Rome – Veii.58 It is not my intention to argue, here, that the possibility of another city taking the ancestral 
place of Rome was more of a reality than the Livian narrative permits, which has in contrast immortalised 
the relocation of Rome to Veii in the speeches of Camillus as a future threat, in place of a past happening. 
Rather, I have tried to show that the various stories and pieces of information regarding the Romans’ 
actions before and during the Gallic attack fit without distortion the notion that the ransom could have 
been solicited outside Rome (and irrespective of whether the Etruscans or Latins played ball) – a practice 
that is well documented for other cities, as we have seen. What is perhaps not so easy to contextualise is 
the (planned) mass-migration of Rome’s population to Veii or another city. But the seemingly concerted 
plan for the Romans’ exodus reinforces the argument here presented, providing a logical explanation for 
their capacity to collect the agreed ransom price outside Rome. That Livy’s text openly comments on the 
ransom payment from those outside Rome later on in the narrative, at 6.14.12, may not render this particular 
ransom narrative more likely in historical terms. But it demonstrates that later Romans knew perfectly well 
that the collection of ransom from outside a captured city was possible, and perhaps even typical; and that 
the (private) resources of the Romans were also believed by them to have been properly removed from the 
eternal city. And as already implied, we can but speculate as to whether they thought that there was space 
in their ancestors’ careful and deliberate evacuation of the city for the forgetting or foregoing of the state 
funds in town. But we can at least be fairly certain that the story of the plebeian anger over the misuse of 
their contribution to the ransom payment does not make sense if these same plebeians are assumed to have 
                                                                                       
57 To acknowledge the plebeians’ location outside Rome has repercussions for the view that ‘the physical limitations 
of the citadel produce the preconditions for Manlius’ sedition’, where ‘there is no wealth to speak of’ but ‘only the 
necessities and not enough of them’: Jaeger 1997, 68. In Livy’s narrative, at 6.14.12, and by contrast, it is the abuse of 
capital (not poverty) that motivates the plebeians’ argument. 
58 The same contradictions plague the narrative of Diodorus Siculus, which has the city’s wealth located on the 
Capitoline Hill (14.115.3-4), but the numerous troops in Veii (14.116.2-4). The army’s location outside Rome – i.e. in 
Veii – is reiterated by Livy in his narrative of another great (military) threat to the Romans, the Battle of the Caudine 
Forks against the Samnites: 9.4.7-16. Interestingly, regarding the later event, Livy stresses the location of the Romans’ 
resources in Rome (9.4.14): Hic omnes spes opesque sunt [...]. For brief comparison of Livy’s accounts of the Gallic attack 
and the Roman disaster at the Caudine Forks, see Oakley 2005, 24. See also the discussion by Levithan 2013, 86-89 
on Livy’s parallel staging of (the successful Roman siege of) Veii and (the Gallic sack of) Rome. 
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remained in Rome, where the Gauls had in any case already taken what they could find: Lucius Albinius 
and his family, albeit diverted to Caere, exemplify the widespread plebeian reaction to the Gallic threat.  
 Interestingly, the plebeian contribution to the ransom, and the quarrel over its later ‘redistribution’ 
by (and amongst) the patricians, might expose another, otherwise subdued narrative strand, namely that the 
plebeians had a clear stake in the rescue of a city that was destined to rule the world (1.16.7) – whatever the 
contribution of the patrician national heroes, Camillus and Manlius, to Roman success: perhaps, the 
narrative’s substratum leaves more room than hitherto acknowledged for a more complex depiction of the 
relationship between the roles of big men and small men in the government of Rome.59 At base, however, 
the appearance of the tributum in a narrative thread concerned with the social division between plebeians 
and patricians, and its neglect in the narrative thread actually concerned with the ransom, might be mistaken 
as evidence for the faulty or flimsy handling of his source(s) by Livy; but it is more likely that Livy selected 
the soldiers’ tributum for the latter story because it strengthened the image of the seditious movement there 
narrated, just as it would have distorted the clear view of Rome in the earlier narrative – providing in turn 
a methodological role model for Tacitus in his very similar differentiated handling of the story of the city’s 
sack in the Histories and the Annals respectively.60 The ransom thus informs Livy’s portrayal of the (so-
called) plebeian sedition, and the social tensions between plebeians and patricians more generally, 
embedded in a complex depiction of contrasts, including locational contrasts (Rome vs. Veii), and numerical 
contrasts (the few who remain in Rome vs. the many who leave for Veii).61   
 
Conclusion 
 
To assume that the source of the ransom payment was located outside Rome makes better sense of the 
happening that we have come to call the Gallic Sack of Rome – avoiding the difficult proposition that a 
few hungry Romans fought off an army of beastly Gauls, thus protecting (one then needs to assume) the 
remaining state, temple and personal treasures from which the ransom required to lift the siege could be 
paid. It may also explain why, at the point at which the ransom money was to be exchanged, the other 
Romans (under Camillus’ leadership) were present in Rome, after a fashionable delay perfectly on time for 
(breaking) the deal, expected – in the line of happenings suggested here – to deliver the agreed ransom 
price, collected from Rome’s holdings outside Rome.62 For all we know, it was the Romans, not the 
‘barbarian’ Gauls who played foul over the ransom arrangement and declined to pay up as previously 
agreed:63 (the danger of) Romans behaving like the ‘barbarian’ Gauls is a well-developed theme in the 
narrative as it stands.64 To be sure, commenting on Camillus’ feat of crossing the enemy lines and arriving 
                                                                                       
59 e.g., Oakley 2015, 239: ‘little or nothing that Livy writes in [Book 5] prevents his readers from deciding that, in a 
time of crisis, it was preferable to be governed by one man than a college of magistrates’. 
60 In Hist. 3.72.1, Tacitus prefers the version in which only the (lower) city is taken, whilst in Ann. 11.23.7, he has the 
Gauls take the Capitoline Hill: Skutsch 1978; see also Horsfall 1981-2, 301-2. 
61 Note also Livy’s framing of events ‘in Rome’ – Romae interim (e.g. 5.46.1), as opposed to ‘in Veii’ – Veiis interim (e.g. 
5.47.4). See also Luce 1971, 280-2, on Livy’s ‘division by place’ as a structuring device. Starkly put, if the Gallic sack 
and the ransom are viewed in a patrician-versus-plebeian framework, the patricians who remained in the city emerge 
as responsible for its loss, and the plebeians who left the city as responsible for its liberation, following on the 
demonstration of the plebeians’ essential military role in the capture of Veii, thereby increasingly challenging the 
patricians’ political dominance. Note also that the report of the prodigy that warned Rome of the approaching Gauls 
was delivered by a plebeian (at 5.32.6-7): see Davies 2004, 40 for discussion of Livy’s comment that the man’s status 
was a reason why the prodigy was ignored.   
62 Livy’s use of delays to create suspense is discussed for 5.32-55 in Luce 1971, 279-83. 
63 pace Ogilvie 1965, ad loc. (p. 738), who in arguing that the Roman complaint over dishonest weights was ignored by 
the Gauls maintained that ‘the simplest explanation is undoubtedly the right one’. 
64 The technique of casting a particular people or individual in the role of the ‘barbarian’ or ‘other’ is widely employed 
in ancient historiography. Livy would have found much inspiration in Polybius, whose most popular ‘barbarians’ 
include, next to the Illyrians, the Gauls. But the historian can also employ his ‘barbarology’ to indicate degeneration 
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safely in the captured city, Wiseman has rightly stressed that the practicalities of fourth century BC warfare 
are not what is at stake here; rather, the researcher’s focus must be on the ‘type of narrative [that] could 
present such stories with any appearance of credibility’.65 So Wiseman asks and answers:66 
 
How did Camillus arrive at the Capitol [...]? Livy refers to the gods’ involvement, and then blandly goes on: ‘For by 
some chance the Dictator arrived’. But the truce had only been to allow negotiations; it would hardly extend to allowing 
Camillus and his relief force to pass through the besiegers’ lines. One can only assume that the Gauls were attoniti, as 
they had been when Fabius Dorsuo, trusting in his gods, walked through their lines to make his sacrifice on the 
Quirinal, and walked back again. 
 
Or that the Gauls were awaiting a Roman delegation to deliver the ransom, at least in a version of the story 
that knew of the fall of the Capitoline Hill and the subsequent ransom payment, collected, as argued here, 
outside Rome: specially agreed embassies with safe passes are mentioned in situations of a city’s capture 
elsewhere in our sources.67 That Livy’s own text features more than once an episode in which a Roman 
crosses unharmed the enemy lines, typically with divine help, does not exclude the possibility that the 
context of Camillus’ arrival in Rome is comfortably embedded in the practicalities of ransom arrangements, 
as known or imagined in later centuries (thereby in fact enhancing the narrative’s credibility).68 Wiseman 
concluded that ‘(t)he sudden appearance of Camillus [...] is easier to imagine on the stage than in real siege 
conditions’:69 it is equally easy to imagine in the context of a ransom arrangement, of the type exemplified 
above on Aegina and Phoenice, Clodius and Caesar. That Livy used his (different) sources with some 
considerable creative knack has already been stressed above: he was what Wiseman himself has called ‘a 
good story-teller’ who ‘knew hardly anything about the real conditions of archaic Rome, and what little he 
did know he ignored’ – a statement also applicable to Livy’s knowledge of (early) fourth century Rome.70 
Having chosen not to foreground the Gallic take-over of Rome in his own version of events does not mean 
that Livy could not use elements of that narrative for his story, suitably adapted, exchanging the delivery of 
the ransom payment with the arrival of a relief force, and so forth, thus suppressing Rome’s most significant 
embarrassment – and humiliation – to date:71 instead of the money, Camillus brought the sword.72 As 
                                                                                       
in a people, group or sub-group otherwise shown to conform to the ideals of the community: Champion 2004, 137-
143 and 193-203. On the Roman (republican) conception of the Gauls (and on Polybius’), see Williams 2001, 68-99; 
and on Roman ‘barbarology’ generally, see D’Auge 1981. The transposition of conqueror and conquered that the 
episode of the alleged defence of the Capitoline Hill thrives on is a guiding theme throughout Book 5 of the AVC, 
played out for instance in (the danger of) Rome’s relocation to Veii (5.24.5), the Roman ambassadors’ ‘Gallic’ 
behaviour (5.36.1), or (the danger of) the Romans’ personal transformation into Veientes (5.52.14; 5.53.7). 
65 Wiseman 2008, 33. 
66 Wiseman 2008, 32. 
67 So for instance in Polybius’ account of the capture of (the ‘lower’ city of) Psophis by Philip of Macedon in 219 BC, 
for the purpose of negotiating the ransom: Polyb. 4.72.3. The account of Sulpicius Galba’s capture of Aegina, 
discussed above, although not specifically mentioning safe passes, only makes sense if this practice is assumed to have 
been employed, and to have been widely known. Livy’s account of the ransom discussion in the context of the Battle 
at the Caudine Forks reiterates moreover the possibility of passing through the Gallic enemy lines at the time: 9.4.8. 
Note also that Thucydides reports Helots crossing the Athenian siege lines in 425 BC, when the Spartan army was 
under siege on Sphacteria, to deliver additional food supplies: 4.26. 
68 The other examples are 5.15.6-7; 5.27.2; 5.46.2-3. Davies 2004, 115-6, shows that Livy’s description of Camillus’ 
appearance at 5.49.1 (... forte quandam ...) embeds this into the larger theme of the workings of the divine in Livy’s 
historical conception.  
69 Wiseman 2008, 35. 
70 Wiseman 2008, 18. 
71 The depth and range of human suffering that a military attack, possible take-over and sack brings with it, caused by 
slaugher, pillage, rape, enslavement and possible destruction, is well brought out in Levithan 2013, 205-27, with 
discussion of specific ancient sack narratives. 
72 By challenging the Gauls in open battle, Camillus demonstrates virtus, which is absent both from siege warfare (i.e. 
from the behaviour of the Gauls) and from a barricade inside the city (i.e. the behaviour of the men on the Capitoline 
Hill). See Levithan 2013, 16-9 and 82-9 for discussion of the ‘virtue’ of open warfare vis-à-vis the shame brought by 
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Forsythe wrote: ‘(i)t is virtually certain that the Romans paid a sizeable ransom to persuade the Gauls to 
leave the city, but Livy instead has Camillus return from exile and appear in the Forum just in time to 
prevent the ultimate embarrassment’.73 Perhaps not ‘every Roman in the street knew about (Camillus’) feats’ 
in full understanding of this Roman hero’s (other) role?74  
 The hypothetical perspective of a ransom collection outside Rome here suggested may also provide 
another, additional explanation for Livy’s eagerness to focus his audiences’ minds on the fixed assets in 
Rome, through the speeches of Camillus, foregrounding the religious topography of Rome, the city’s 
temples, as much as Rome’s mythological relationship with its location (5.30.1-7; 5.50-54) – to avert the 
gaze from the evil not of his own days (pref. 4) but of the episode that was the Gallic take-over of Rome, 
when men, women and the bulk of the movable assets, had long left the city, its temples and shrines – to 
the disgrace of the (later) Romans.75 To quote Williams again: ‘[...] it is a story of the transformation of a 
memory of defeat and capture into victory and rebirth’.76 Evidently, it is not my purpose here to try and 
establish what actually happened, but simply to argue that, whatever happened in the night when the geese 
suffered from insomnia on the Capitoline Hill, a ransom is a perfectly suitable element in a story of a Gallic 
take-over of Rome – hill and all; and that it cannot be taken as evidence that an alternative narrative to the 
successful defence of the Capitoline Hill never existed – as Varro already knew. 
 
 
Author: Dr U. Roth, The University of Edinburgh, u.roth@ed.ac.uk.  
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